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I HAVE ENJOYED AND LEARNED SO MUCH from Charles P. Kindleberger's books that 
I must give considerable  weight  to his objections.  Nonetheless,  I do think that he 
has reacted  very sharply  to some  points  that  might  seem  less exceptional  upon 
rereading. Stephen  A. Schuker's critique  rests more upon  general  methodologi- 
cal considerations  and some differing economic  premises; in response I shall  try 
to point out where our views converge  and where they are likely to remain  sub- 
ject  to further debate. 
BY REFERRING TO ELITES, I do not propose C. Wright  Mills's concept  of one  in- 
terlocking  power  elite  (against  which  Daniel  Bell leveled  some  disabling  objec- 
tions  two decades  ago).'  It seems too self-evident  to belabor  that  some  individ- 
uals  and  groups  enjoy  more  influence  over  political  decisions  and  economic 
arrangements  than  do  others,  often  more  numerous.  To  suggest  that  over- 
lapping  circles of  civil  servants,  elected  politicians,  eminent  businessmen,  and 
sometimes  intellectuals,  including  academics,  have  played  continuing  roles  in 
shaping  public  outcomes  hardly  amounts  to a conspiracy  theory.  Nor  does  ob- 
serving that,  although  we elect  by a democratic  process important  leaders with 
clear political  responsibility,  many of the men and women  who manage  our bu- 
reaucracies,  institutions,  and  large-scale economic  units are merely coopted. 
I do not equate,  moreover, the events of the  1920s with those of the  1940s and 
1950s. As I stated  in  the  essay,  I deny  identity  but  discern  parallels.  I do  not 
think  that  the  concepts  of stability  and  of  the  value  of  broad  economic  inter- 
course held by the policymakers  of the  1940s were so different from the ideas of 
the more internationalist  businessmen  and statesmen  of the  1920s. Historical  re- 
search of the past generation  has suggested  that American  "isolation" is relative 
at best: useful, perhaps, to characterize  a fear of security commitments  that  cli- 
maxed  with  the  Neutrality  Acts  but  less  revealing  for  the  economic  in- 
volvements  of the  1920s. And,  for every contrast between  the currency and  eco- 
nomic  developments  of the  1920s and those after  1945, I find an instructive,  not 
merely  a  captious,  comparison.  Of  course,  the  scale  of  economic  intervention 
was  far more  intense  and  successful  after World  War  II. That  was  one  of  my 
major points.  But many  of the structural dilemmas  (those created,  for example, 
by  the  postwar  creditor  position  of  the  United  States)  emerged  at  both  junc- 
tures.  For  Professor Kindleberger,  the  change  in  degree  between  the  blighted 
initiatives  of  the  1920s and  the  successes  of  the  second  era  renders  the  com- 
' Bell, "Is  There a Ruling Class in America?  The Power Elite Reconsidered,"  in his The  End  of IdeoloKgy:  On 
the  Exhaustion  of Political  Ideas  in the  Fifties  (New York, 1960), 47-74. 
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parison  invalid.  For me,  it suggests  caution  but  does  not  remove  the  heuristic 
value. 
To  take two specific issues, consider the steel agreements  and currency reform. 
The  juxtaposing  of  the  steel  agreements  of  the  1920s and  the  later  Coal-Steel 
Community  is perforce incomplete,  but it is not "specious." Granted,  the earlier 
experience  responded  to saturated  markets and encouraged  quotas, whereas the 
ECSC emerged  while output  was still low. In both cases, however, Germans  and 
French sought to integrate leading  industrial sectors at the cost of some national 
industrial  independence.  In both cases, the French exploited  a transitory superi- 
ority to negotiate  agreements  that  were designed  to compensate  them  for their 
longer-term  vulnerability;  in both  cases, international  agreement  accompanied 
other supranational  political  linkages. 
Concerning  the German  currency  reforms, my arguments  on the inflation  of 
1918-23,  which  are set out elsewhere,  sought  to emphasize  that  the views of in- 
flation  "destroying"  the  German  middle  classes  or  delivering  them  to  Hitler 
were too simple and that the way in which  inflations are ended  can be as politi- 
cally  devastating  as inflation  itself.2 The  currency  reform of  1948-I,  too,  be- 
lieve-was  engineered  well, but it could have been instituted  a year or so earlier; 
the costs of the delay  were harsh in real, as well as in monetary,  terms. Indeed, 
when  Professor Kindleberger  admits  that revaluation  was delayed  on  "ideologi- 
cal" grounds, I think he really buttresses my arguments.  I would  note,  too,  that 
the  Lastenausgleich,  or compensatory  levy,  instituted  in stages in  1948 and  after 
1952 was less thoroughgoing  than  the one  envisaged  in the Colm-Dodge-Gold- 
smith  plan.  The  original  proposal  to couple  economic  redistribution  with  tech- 
nical monetary  reform was shelved.  Moreover,  the C-D-G  plan  foresaw a redis- 
tribution  of assets partly to compensate  for war losses but partly to equalize  the 
starting position  of those who  had  preserved only  paper claims  (bank accounts, 
bonds) with those who had houses or business plants  (largely freed of incumbent 
debt).  The  later Lastenausgleich  abandoned  this broader scope; again,  an instruc- 
tive comparison  can  be made  with  the limited  revaluation  of debts  and  claims 
in  1924-25.  But in the new conditions  of economic  growth after  1948, the limits 
made  less difference.3 
When  Professor Kindleberger  objects  to  the  "second half ' of my  thesis  (the 
stages of stability),  I must protest on several grounds. I do not claim  that  dissent 
was merely repressed in the first postwar period; the argument  stresses ideologi- 
cal  relegitimatization.  Kindleberger  writes  that  various  countries  tried  various 
2 See Charles S. Maier, "Die deutsche Inflation als Verteilungskonflikt:  Soziale Ursachen und Auswirkun- 
gen im internationalen Vergleich," in Otto Busch and Gerald Feldman, eds., Historische  Prozesse  der  deutschen 
Inflation, 1914  bis 1922  (Berlin,  1978),  329-42,  and  Recasting Bourgeois  Europe:  Stabilization in France, Germany,  and 
Italy  in the  Decade  after  World  War  I (Princeton, 1975), 358-64, 483-94. (Professor  Schuker,  by the way, dissents 
from my emphasis and would presumably feel uncomfortable with Professor  Kindleberger's  joining us all.) 
Obviously, the hyperinflation  was worse than a common cold; but German democracy  was afflicted with sev- 
eral potentially lethal ailments. 
' For the currency reform and Lastenausgleich,  see, among other sources, Hans Moller, "Die westdeutsche 
Wahrungsreform  von  1948," in  Wdhrung  und Wirtschaft  in Deutschland, 1876-1975  (Frankfurt  a/M,  1976),  433- 
83; and G. Weissner,  "Die Gesetzgebung  uber den Lastenausgleich:  Bemerkungen  zu ihrer  Geschichte  und kri- 
tische Analyse ihrer Grundgedanken,"  Finanzarchiv,  new ser., 16 (1955): 62-80. The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions  for Stability  365 
economic  alternatives  after 1945, only to abandon  them when  they failed. Is this 
so different from my view that "throughout  the first three postwar years, in fact, 
there  was  less decisive  purpose  than  confused  experimentation  and  uncertain 
initiatives"  (page 343)? Whether Jean  Monnet's  planning  was really an alterna- 
tive  to  capitalism  or a  variant  of  it  remains  the  subject  of  debate.  The  inter- 
penetration  of political  and economic  decision  makers does not allow easy typo- 
logy  for France any more  than  it does  for most other  industrial  societies. 
Finally,  Mancur  Olson, Jr.'s, argument,  which  emerges most clearly in his re- 
cent  presentations,4 that  the thicket  of interest groups in the United  States  and 
Britain  has impeded  economic  growth,  whereas  the  shattering  of their equiva- 
lents in Germany  and Japan  unleashed  new  energy,  seems  too simple  to me.  I 
submit,  contrary  to my  understanding  of Olson's  work, that  not  the  density  of 
interest groups but the degree of cohesion  or lack thereof separates the economic 
leaders from the laggards. Anglo-American  liberalism has been updated  into  an 
adversarial and bumbling  pluralism; in the growth leaders, interest groups have 
been  certainly  dense  (and sprang  back  quickly)  but  have  built  upon  traditions 
of premodern  social discipline. 
Of course, this is an argument  for continuity,  which  was the burden  of my es- 
say. Yes,  1945 learned  from the mistakes of  1919: indeed,  Charles Kindleberger 
was one  of those to apply  the lessons with  enthusiasm  and  good  sense when  he 
was at the Department  of State. This hardly means he could not have been  con- 
tributing  to an effort at stabilization  (and renewal), the terms of which had been 
outlined  earlier. I did not say that  the United  States intervened  to save  capital- 
ism and  the market. We  stayed  in Western  Europe because  we did  not like the 
Soviet  presence in Eastern Europe.  But to state that  is not  to deny  that  the  up- 
shot of events  was a version of market  liberalism  relatively  close  to our  prefer- 
ences. 
DESPITE  STEPHEN  SCHUKER'S  EMPHASIS  upon  our  Christian  Democratic  inter- 
locutors,  I still  feel that  farsighted  American  policymakers  perceived  that  but- 
tressing social democracy  was necessary to save both  liberty and  markets  (page 
346). Washington  had to wager upon  the forces of the center, hence  on De Gas- 
pari and even, exasperatedly,  on Bidault; but, until  1950 or so, officials persisted 
in viewing  social  democracy  as an ideological  fulcrum. 
Many  of Professor Schuker's critiques do not significantly  diverge from argu- 
ments  in my essay. It is true, as he states, that  distributive  conflicts hardly lie in 
the past alone. As I intimate in my conclusion  (and state on pages 340-41),  how- 
ever, the very recent period  (say, since  1973 or so) concluded  a quarter-century 
marked  by  their  astonishingly  low  level.  To  be  sure, the  broad  forces of  tech- 
nology  (as well  as of mass education,  leisure, and  changing  family  and  sexual 
mores) are absent  from my  account.  As I state explicitly,  I do not wish  to deny 
' Olson, "The Political Economy of Comparative Growth Rates," in James Gapinski and Charles Rock- 
wood,  eds.,  Essays in Post-Keynesian  Inflation (Cambridge,  Mass.,  1979),  137-59. 366  Reply 
social transformation,  only  to emphasize  the political  continuity  even  as society 
altered. 
The  "fortunate confluence  of circumstances"  (page 355)  that  Professor Schu- 
ker finds responsible for post-1945  economic  growth  is not so different from the 
causes to which  I refer (pages 343-44).  In general, I am less convinced  than  my 
critic that monetary stabilization is the motor of growth. (Einaudi's brilliance may 
have  helped  perpetuate  southern  Italian  dualism.  Erhard  inherited  a currency 
reform, a Social Democratic  party at an impasse, and the West's crying need  for 
German  resources.) Ultimately,  it may  require growth to make monetary  stabi- 
lization  "stick." Both those who stress monetary  factors and those who argue for 
structural or political  ones can provide coherent models. What  is challenging  for 
the  historian  is that  the  differing  approaches  to  questions  of  economic  policy 
today  must  be  present  in  any  assessment  of  past  issues. This  holds  for the  di- 
lemmas  of the  latter  1920s, for policy  in the Depression  (where monetarist  and 
Keynesian  accounts  clearly compete),  for the issues of  1945 and after. No  histor- 
ical issue, I suspect, can be resolved with  any degree of certainty  greater than  is 
granted  to the economic  prescriptions  for analogous  contemporary  problems. 
There  is room to differ over the role of Marshall  Plan aid. I believe  that it was 
critical first in demonstrating  an American  political  commitment  and second  in 
overcoming  balance-of-payment  constraints-but-  only  to  a  subsidiary  degree 
(and  this was  the  point  of my  calculations)  in rebuilding  Europe  in the  crude 
sense often invoked.  In this regard, the discrepancy  between  the total aid to each 
country  in Professor Schuker's note  9 (page  357)  and  my  own  in note  36  (page 
342)  is readily  explainable.  I deliverately  excluded  pre-Interim  Aid  (pre-emi- 
nently  UNRRA  relief) and post-1951  Mutual  Security  assistance,  largely  slated 
for rearmament.  I also  focused  only  on  the  four major recipients.  I do  not  see 
where I deny that ECA officials urged deployment  of counterpart  funds to boost 
demand;  indeed,  I identify  them  as the Keynesian  bulwark in the making of for- 
eign  economic  policy,  and  I think  the  sources will  confirm  my  reading  of  the 
contrast with  the Treasury.  Finally,  my own comparison  of the dilemmas  of the 
late  1920s with  contemporary  difficulties  (see page  340)  hardly  corresponds  to 
any  Keynesian  hubris. 
I find  more  to  the  point  Professor Schuker's criticism  that  I exaggerate  the 
threat of the Left and  the managerial  response of the conservatives  after World 
War  I. My  argument  here, however,  relies (as I note)  not on actual  power  but 
on alternative  ideological  visiodns.  For the legitimacy  of capitalism,  the battle  be- 
tween  ideologies  and  utopias  of the productive  order did  remain  critical.  What 
is more,  leading  defenders  of capitalism-Olivetti,  Vogler,  Rathenau,  Mercier, 
Mond-recognized  this. The  point  is not that  fear of Bolshevism  directly  moti- 
vated  modernization  of plant,  improvements  in  technology  (such as cogenera- 
tion),  mergers  and  coordinated  planning  (such  as  electricity  networks),  and 
Tayloristic  efforts at labor rationalization.  Rather,  these changes  were prodded 
by,  and  in turn encouraged,  a confidence  in the mission of managerial  capital- 
ism after it had  overcome  a sharp challenge. 
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trate, as he suggests, the natural differences that can result from more or less in- 
ductive  approaches.  Nonetheless,  I would  be reluctant  to accept  the designation 
of a deductive  historian.  The  length  alloted  to an essay does not permit  retrac- 
ing all of the trails through  lowlands  and woods  that have led to the ridges and 
vistas. This  does  not  mean  that  the  historian  has not  traversed  them.  Schuker 
suggests that my use of the term capitalism  in vague  enough  to mean  bourgeois 
democracy.  Fair enough  for the  period  since  1945-if  the  adjective  remains  in 
view.  More  generally,  I think,  he speaks for the many  who  distrust using  ideal 
types  for historical  summation.  The  American  Historical Review has  recently  fea- 
tured learned objections  to the concepts  of feudalism  and  fascism.5 Clearly,  it is 
easy to cite cases that  depart  from any typology,  which  by its nature must  sim- 
plify. Yet employing  political  constructs need not require burdening  them  emo- 
tionally  in advance,  nor need  it involve  renouncing  the complementary  search 
for variation.  But how can the historian dispense with  generalization?  Forests as 
well  as trees undergo  phases of growth  and  destruction. 
I OFFER THIS PIECE NOT TO CLAIM that  it represents the correct interpretation  but 
to present one way  to think about  the links between  the crises and the recovery 
of  twentieth-century  European  society.  When  I  presented  the  paper  at  the 
American  Historical  Association  meetings  of  December  1978,  Professor J.  H. 
Hexter  admitted  sympathetically  that  it  had  been  stimulating  but  won- 
dered  if, after all, the  real reason  for stability  following  World  War  II did  not 
derive from the simple fact that people were tired of despotism. The  observation 
was  sobering  in  its implication  that  my  account  might  be  overstructured.  Let 
me  respond  two  years later that  people  rarely want  despotism,  or war, or idle 
factories, or worthless money.  But they sometimes  get them.  Here I have tried to 
outline  the circumstances  that  let at least some  of them  translate yearnings  for 
normalcy  into the liberal capitalist  efflorescence that  followed  the great wars of 
our century. 
CHARLES S. MAIER 
Duke University 
'Elizabeth  A. R. Brown, "The Tyranny of a Construct:  Feudalism and Historians  of Medieval Europe," 
AHR, 79 (1974): 1063-88; and Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism  Is Not: Thoughts on the Deflation of a Con- 
cept," ibid.,  84 (1979): 367-88. 